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In a previous note on these same pages, we made reference to Obama’s 
unpredictable use of executive power and his tendency to overuse it for 
certain domestic policies, while deferring to the military and foreign 
policy establishmenton issues he is ambivalent about,  such as the 
international use of force. We also alluded to his tendency to isolate 
himself and rely excessively on his own judgment in shaping policy, to the 
detriment of his relations with staff, cabinet and other leaders. The long-
drawn decision to seek Congressional approval before striking Syria is a 
case study of these proclivities. 
After resisting calls for intervention in Syria by Senate Republican 
“hawks”and foreign policy specialists since 2011, a year ago Obama 
conceded that, in spite of his aversion to intervene in “sectarian 
struggles”,certain actions such as the use of chemical weapons by the 
Syrian regime against the opposition would constitute a “red line” which, 
once crossed, would automatically bring about an armed response by the 
United States. This week he had to face the consequences of his own 
words. 
Whenrobust evidence of the use of sarin gas by Bashar Al Assad’s forces 
in rebel occupied territory was produced, the President had no choice but 
to spendthelast week of the month of Augustfrantically building a case for 
immediate intervention. Acting simultaneously as Chief Executive, policy 
shaper and his own spokesman, he used several venues, including an 
NPR interview, to announce to the American people that the time had 
come to act. 
But while Secretary of State John Kerry made a compelling speech on the 
need to act swiftly to punish the “moral obscenity” committed by the 
Assad regime, Obama appeared much more circumspect in his appeals to 
the American people. His early words conveyed both his outrage at the 
disproportionate actions by Assad as well as his empathy with the war-
weary American citizens.  In private, he confided he had qualms both 
about the legality and the political legitimacy of military action. In public, 
his argument focused on the violation of an international convention 
prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the absolutely unavoidable 
duty to enforce it. But the fact that UN inspectors had not completed their 
field report on the attack, coupled with the refusal of the UN Security 
Council to consider armed action, gave him pause and forced him to 
confront his own doubts once again. 
In the meantime, momentum was building in the United States where, 
according to press reports, it was all but certain there would be a military 
strike to “punish and deter” the Syrian regime, by Labor Day weekend. 
GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were vocal in their 
support of intervention but demanded more than just a punitive strike 
and showed some impatience towards the President’s pondering an 
action that should have been decided long ago. 
Abroad, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia were in favor of the US action. 
As it is widely known, Russia was against it and that is why the US had to 
bypass the UN Security Council where Russia has veto power. While 
NATO allies all offered strong support (indeed, both France and Britain 
were the first to insist on support for the rebels a year ago), Prime 
Minister David Cameron was delivered a strong blow when he lost a vote 
in the House of Commons, with some of his own backbenchers voting 
against intervention. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, facing a coming 
election and against the perennial background of German Basic Law 
constraints, had already told the President that Germany would stand in 
the sidelines, while offering moral support. The long shadow cast by the 
Iraqi war around the world once again became evident. But the French 
President, not required by the Fifth Republic Constitution to consult the 
legislature, and encouraged by France’s recent successful actions in Mali 
and Libya, remained firm. 
By Friday, Obama’s tortured deliberations came to an end as he abruptly 
changed courses. Against the advice of his National Security and political 
advisors team, he made a dramatic announcement from the Rose Garden: 
his decision on the need for a narrow punitive action against Syria had 
been made, he said, but he had decided to ask for Congressional 
authorization first. As Commander in Chief, and in spite of the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973, he is not obligated to do this. He thus appears 
to be shifting responsibility onto the legislature while 
simultaneouslybuying some time to explore diplomatic solutions in the 
upcoming G-20 summer. 
The cerebral constitutional law professor and the risk- taking politician in 
him have made a Faustian bargain. If Congress authorizes the use of 
force, he will have both legal and political cover for his action while at the 
same time fulfilling his moral duty of punishing a violator of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and of Humanitarian law. If they vote No, he can 
just blame them for his own lack of action and use all the power of the 
Presidency on his domestic agenda. 
It is, in any case, a big gamble, one that has the potential of weakening 
him and turning him into a lame duck for the rest of his Presidency. The 
GOP is internally divided on many issues, among them foreign policy, 
where conservative ideologies run the gamut from minimalist 
/isolationist to neo-cons/regime- change interventionists and all the 
shades in-between. And the far left in Obama’s own party is against 
intervention. So there is no guarantee he will get Congressional approval. 
The cost of losing this vote is enormous: it may set a strong precedent in 
diminishing Presidential prerogatives. 
To be fair to the President and his vacillating stance, this is not an easy 
decision. None of the world leaders have made a compelling public case 
for a strategic need of intervention in Syria. The proposed limited 
“punitive” strike will most likely be inconclusive: it will not deter further 
extreme actions by Assad, who has now been given time to disperse his 
military assets and capabilities. The strike will not significantly degrade 
his capacity to fight, and there will be little change in his main goal, 
namely, to destroy the opposition and regain total control of the country. 
This is a fight to the end by both sides. If overthrown, Assad and his 
Alawite supporters (as well as the Christians who have traditionally been 
under his protection) will be massacred. There are no desirable outcomes 
in this conflict. The rebels are divided and the biggest group is that ofthe 
jihadists with strong support of Al Qaeda. While Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and Israel are on the side of the United States and want a moderate 
alternative to the Assad regime, Iran, to an extent Iraq, and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon are on the dictator’s side (as, incongruously, is Venezuela). The 
Palestinian group Hamas, previously favoring Assad has now changed 
sides and is supporting the rebels. So in many ways this is a war by proxy 
that could become a generalized regional war. There is no indication that 
the President or anyone else has a political plan or a diplomatic effort in 
mind for the post-strike scenario. 
However, US inaction at this time undermines the security of its allies, 
especially Israel.  Even though Netanyahu has adopted a “no comment” 
stance and hasn’t, accordingly, said a word on this issue, other Israeli 
politicians are worrying out loud about the implications the US lack of 
resolve will have on other “red lines”: Will the United States act when 
Iran crosses the nuclear threshold? Or will Israel find itself facing Iran 
alone?They bitterly remind themselves of Obama’s speech in Jerusalem, 
in March this year, when he said in Hebrew: “Atem lo levad” (“You are 
not alone”). They are very skeptical, now more than ever, that the 
President will match his lofty rhetoric with action. 
In the United States the momentum is gone, Congress won’t reconvene 
until September 9, and the President is using the last week of summer to 
energetically lobby House and Senate leaders and persuade skeptics 
through intelligence briefings. Urgent issues in the domestic agenda will 
thus have to be postponed. 
What no one, either at home or abroad denies, is that the credibility of the 
Presidency and with it, that of the United States, is at stake. International 
support for the operation is unlikely to improve. A negative vote by 
Congress will further weaken the President and may complicate the White 
House legislative agenda, where he will have to spend all his political 
capital and still,perhaps, fall short. 
In a keynote speech to the National Defense University earlier this year, 
Obama expressed the need to chart a new way in American foreign policy, 
one that would end the “perpetual wartime footing” that characterized the 
post 9-11 era, after G.W. Bush got a virtual blank check from Congress in 
the use of military force and intelligence gathering. So far, Obama has 
ended two protracted unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is 
clear he will not engage in regime change. But a new foreign policy 
strategy has not crystallized yet. There is no Obama doctrine, no overall 
framework to guide his decisions and give predictability to his actions. 
His whole approach to the Middle East, the most explosive region in the 
planet today, is misconceived. His tepid reaction to the Egyptian situation 
had already given some approximation of how reluctant he is about 
taking sides in conflicts in the region.  Syrian use of chemical weapons 
has confirmed his ambivalence and exposed his indecision. At the same 
time, it has provoked a collapse of American credibility abroad, 
anduncertainty about its reliability as an ally.  Regardless of what follows 
after this week, his hesitancy will have dire consequences for American 
foreign policy into the future. 
 The larger problem that looms over the heads of world leaders and that 
few seem to acknowledge is that this is not about Syria or Egypt or Libya 
or Yemen or Tunisia as separate conflicts; it is a regional conflagration 
that has to be addressedcomprehensively, within the larger regional and 
international context. All major actors, whether it is Europe, Russia, or 
China and of course the United States, have a stake in the region and it is 
in their interest to define the rules of the game and together find an 
overall solution to this predicament. 
 
